It has been reported that a ransomware, dubbed "RTM Locker" has advanced capabilities which is targeting Linux and VMware ESXi platforms exclusively.
The threat actors behind the malware operates as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) provider and infuse it with the capabilities to infect Linux, NAS, and ESXi hosts etc. The ransomware encrypts critical data, files, documents etc. and threaten the victim to public the sensitive details while asking for ransom payment.
Infection Mechanism
Virtual Machines/ ESXi platform are increasingly being implemented in enterprise environment because of their advanced capabilities and ease of access. The RTM locker ransomware focusses on VMware ESXi servers for attack as observed in the current trend, initial infection vector of the malware is still unknown.
RTM group created the Linux encryptors using asymmetric and symmetric encryption techniques which makes it difficult to mitigate the attack and to decrypt all these files as it require attacker's private key. The malware’s encryption algorithm is statically compiled in binary code making it more efficient and difficult to reverse engineer.
During infection, the encryptor first gather the list of all active VMs before staring encryption then it terminates all active VMs. Before encrypting the files, it terminates the antivirus and backup and deletes shadow copies for making recovery difficult.

Once all the active VMs are terminated, the encryptor starts to encrypt the files that are related to VMs on ESXi host with the following extension: - .vmem (virtual machine memory), .vmsn (VM snapshots), .vmdk (virtual disks), .vswp (swap files), and .log (log files).
During encrypting files, the encryptor appends the .RTM file extension to encrypted file's names, and after it's done, creates ransom note named "Warning" on the infected system.
In this warning, the threat actors ask to contact RTM support via TOX for ransom payment and warn the victims of leaking the data on public domain.

It has also the capability to change the screen wallpaper, empty the recycle bin, wipe event logs and execute the shell command that self-deletes the locker.
Indicator of Compromise:
SHA 256:
- 55b85e76abb172536c64a8f6cf4101f943ea826042826759ded4ce46adc00638
- b376d511fb69085b1d28b62be846d049629079f4f4f826fd0f46df26378e398b
- d68c99d7680bf6a4644770edfe338b8d0591dfe143278412d5ed62848ffc99e0
Best Practices and Recommendations:
- Maintain offline backups of data, and regularly maintain backup and restoration. This practice will ensure the organization will not be severely interrupted, have irretrievable data.
- Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted) and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure.
- Enable protected files in the Windows Operating System to prevent unauthorized changes to critical files.
- Implement all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) to have strong, unique passwords.
- Implement multi-factor authentication for all services to the extent possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks, and accounts that access critical systems.